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Abstract
As organizations have become more reliant on computers and technology to operate in a
globalized world, they have also become more vulnerable to cyberattacks on their networks. The
expense to organizations from cyberattacks now exceeds $400 billion USD annually. These costs
highlight the need for behavioral research in the cyber domain. The first phase of this research
developed an instrument to measure workers’ cybersecurity attitudes. An iterative process
resulted in a scale with good psychometric properties - The Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale. The
scale measures two factors: cyber policy adherence attitudes and perceived vulnerability to a
cyberattack. The second phase of this research used the theory of planned behavior as a
theoretical framework to model the relationship between personality facets, policy adherence
attitudes, perceived vulnerability, locus of control, cybersecurity climate, and cybersecurity
behaviors. While the hypothesized model had poor fit for the data, there was a strong
relationship between cybersecurity attitudes (i.e. policy adherence attitudes and perceived
vulnerability) and dutifulness, altruism, compliance, cybersecurity climate, and cybersecurity
behavior. This research provides practical value to academic researchers and organizations by
providing a scale to measure cybersecurity attitudes and to help organizations better understand
the nature of the antecedents that lead to cybersecurity attitudes and behavior.
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Chapter One
Introduction
The emergence of new technologies, and especially information technology (IT), has had
a monumental impact on how organizations conduct their business and how workers are able to
perform their jobs (Valcour & Hunter, 2005). Long gone are the days of employees working with
pen and paper, filing paperwork by hand, and storing massive amounts of data in a records
closet. The personal computer, local-area networking, and use of the Internet has improved
worker efficiency and capability, and this transition to a computerized world is still a rapidly
evolving environment. In 1999, Kevin Ashton coined the term “the Internet of Things (IoT)”
when describing the management of supply chains (Ashton, 2009). The term has recently gained
popularity, but at the time Ashton was referring to how “things” other than just personal
computers would one day be connected to the Internet. While an astute observation, it is quite
possible even Ashton could not foresee the magnitude of how many devices would one day be
connected to the Internet (Dorsey, Martin, Howard, & Coovert, 2017). In 2011, for the first time
the number of Internet-connected devices outnumbered the population of the Earth, and that
number (7 billion) is expected to more than triple by the year 2020, with analysts projecting 24
billion Internet-connected devices to be in use (Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic, & Palaniswami, 2013).
The combination of technologies such as the personal computer and the Internet with
newer technologies such as smartphones, cloud computing, and virtual private networking have
given rise to a workplace that reaches new heights for productivity and communication. The
workplace itself has changed as it is now commonplace for many workers to have the ability to
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work from home or have seamless access to their company’s resources whether in the office or
on the road. All of this newfound access to information from anywhere in the world comes at a
heavy cost: the need for organizations to protect their company’s data, such as personnel
information and intellectual property, through cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity belongs to a new breed of technologies referred to as “exponential
technologies” (Briggs & Shingles, 2015). Until recently, the speed at which technology moved
forward was defined by Moore’s Law, which states that every two years technologies such as
personal computing double in computing power, while the price of the technology is cut in half
(Schaller, 1997). Along with technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and industrial
biology; cybersecurity is considered an exponential technology because its rate of advancement
is moving at a much faster pace than Moore’s Law describes (Briggs & Shingles, 2015; Dorsey,
et al., 2017). While exponential technologies can assist organizations with faster attainment of
goals and productivity, they can also have a disruptive effect on the workplace (Arena, 2014;
Briggs & Shingles, 2015). Globally, the total cost to organizations from cybersecurity breaches
reached over $315 billion U.S. dollars in 2014 (Grant Thornton, 2015), and this number has been
increasing for the past several years. Because of the devastating financial effect cybersecurity
can have on organizations and workers, the need for research on cybersecurity topics is at an alltime high.
This research aspires to add to the limited published research studying the behavioral side
of cybersecurity, and the antecedents to those behaviors. For the purposes of behavioral research
on the topic of cybersecurity, it is important to distinguish between information security and
cybersecurity. Much like the name implies, information security refers to the protection of
information and assets of an organization. Von Solms and van Niekerk (2013) present an
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excellent distinction between the information security and cybersecurity by stating that while
cybersecurity encompasses information security (IS), it also includes the protection of the
employees of the organization. The human factor in cybersecurity must be considered not only
for the role humans play in protecting organization data and intellectual property, but also
because humans are often the target of cyberattacks. In an effort to illustrate the human role in
cybersecurity, two recent examples of cybersecurity breaches will be briefly summarized.
In late November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment confirmed they had been the victim
of a criminal cyberattack. A purported hacktivist group (i.e. a group that hacks for ideological
reasons, much like an activist) named the Guardians of Peace claimed responsibility for the
attack and revealed they were stealing Sony’s data for upwards of a year before their final attack.
In addition to stealing up to 100 terabytes of data that included employee’s salaries and social
security numbers, the attackers targeted Sony’s intellectual property, including four feature films
that were uploaded to the Internet prior to release (Zetter, 2014). Additionally, using the
commercially available wiping program Rawdisk, the attackers were able to completely wipe
and destroy the information on Sony’s corporate computers.
In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) announced its computer
network had been breached and that 4 million employees’ records had been stolen (Barrett,
Yadron, & Paletta, 2015). On July 9, 2015, the news got even worse as OPM confirmed its initial
estimate was far below the actual figure, and that the records of 21.5 million Americans who had
undergone background security checks had their personal information stolen (Zengerle &
Cassella, 2015). Later it was discovered the information stolen included the fingerprints of 5.6
million federal employees, many with top-secret security clearances (Greenberg, 2015).
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In both of these cyberattacks, the access to the organizations’ networks was obtained
through a social engineering technique known as spear-phishing (Bort, 2014; Kelly, 2015), a
tactic where an employee is targeted by an attacker and then the attacker sends a fraudulent email
to the user in hopes the employee clicks on a URL link or an attachment in the email that deploys
malware (e.g. viruses, Trojan horse, keyloggers) on their computer (Dorsey et al., 2017). Almost
one million new instances of malware were created each day last year (Symantec, 2015). Spearphishing is an increasingly popular social engineering technique to distribute malware that is
designed to prey upon the naivety and inexperience of workers. Large organizations, such as the
two aforementioned examples, are not the only companies being attacked either. In 2014, 60
percent of all targeted attacks were directed at small and medium sized organizations (i.e.
companies with fewer than 2,500 employees; Symantec, 2015); illustrating the need for
cybersecurity research that benefits all organizations and employees.
Social Engineering
Social engineering is the centerpiece of the human component of cybersecurity and is
defined as gaining unauthorized access to computer networks through the use of psychological
tricks, deception, or manipulation (Erbschloe, 2005; Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Dorsey
et al., 2017). The employees of organizations are the targets of social engineering tactics because
they are the most vulnerable part of the cybersecurity environment and are much easier and less
time-consuming for hackers to attack than trying to gain intrusion through a breach prevention
plan that an organization has in place (Krombholz, Hovel, Huber, & Weippl, 2014).
Krombholz et al. (2014) details four approaches of social engineering attacks: physical,
social, technical, and socio-technical. A physical approach to social engineering would occur if
the attackers had physical access to an organization’s information; whether that entailed going
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through the trash of the organization or simply looking for post-it notes containing passwords on
an employee’s desk. When using the social approach, the attacker relies on persuading the victim
through developing a relationship with them or by portraying an authority figure to the victim.
An example of using the social approach would be for an attacker to call an employee at an
organization’s help desk and state that they are a traveling manager and need access to the
company’s network, thus manipulating a password from the employee through a telephone
conversation (Krombholz et al., 2014).
An example of the technical approach to social engineering would be to use open source
information that is readily available on the Internet (e.g. information that is available on a
person’s social media profile) and use that information to manipulate an employee into giving a
password or other access to the network. Lastly, the socio-technical approach is a combination of
the social and technical approach. In addition to spear-phishing, another example of the sociotechnical approach is baiting. Baiting occurs when an attacker leaves media containing malware,
such as a USB flash drive, near or in an office building with the intention that the person who
finds the media will place it in an office computer (Krombholz et al., 2014; Dorsey et al., 2017).
Once the USB drive is placed in a computer, the malware can deploy itself undetected and
spread throughout the organization’s network.
The rise in the number of malware created each year, the total costs to organizations of
cybersecurity breaches, and the increasingly manipulative social engineering techniques used by
attackers prove a need for behavioral research in this domain. If organizations can ascertain
which factors may make employees more susceptible to social engineering techniques, they
could administer an assessment to assist with screening out potentially harmful employees prior
to offering employment. Furthermore, the assessment could be administered to current
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employees to help identify which employees might be most in need of comprehensive
cybersecurity training. Although there has been a lack of behavioral research regarding
cybersecurity in general, recent work has begun in the information security behaviors domain
(Siponen, 2000; Herath & Rao, 2009; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Guo 2013). This
study aims to better understand the relationship between personality facets as an antecedent of
cybersecurity behaviors within a framework based on the theory of planned behavior.
Personality
This research seeks to extend current personality and Industrial / Organizational
psychology (I-O) research to the cybersecurity domain. Psychology researchers have been
interested in personality for over 100 years, as the first appearance of personality as a topic of
study in an academic journal occurred in 1906 in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology
(Barenbaum & Winter, 2008). Throughout the history of personality research, one topic has
remained much studied, while also remaining much debated: the analysis of the factor structure
of personality traits. Early research in determining personality structure focused on using a
lexical approach to identify personality traits by studying trait-descriptive words (Goldberg,
1993).
Raymond Cattell, one of the early pioneers of personality structure research, built upon
the lexical approach by using factor analysis to study the 4,504 trait-descriptive terms that
Gordon Allport and Henry Odbert compiled in 1936 (Goldberg, 1993; Cattell, 1943; Allport &
Odbert, 1936). Cattell first categorized the massive list of words into 171 variables, and then
further reduced the number to 60 provisional personality titles. These titles included categories
such as “infantile / hostile” and “facile / forward / verbose” (Cattell, 1943). Using factor analytic
techniques, Cattell later settled on 12 primary factors of personality (Barenbaum & Winter,

6

2008): Warmth (A), Reasoning (B), Emotional Stability (C), Dominance (E), Liveliness (F),
Rule-Consciousness (G), Social Boldness (H), Sensitivity (I), Vigilance (L), Abstractedness (M),
Privateness (N), Apprehension (O). Ultimately, his work led him to create the 16PF personality
questionnaire, which added four more factors: Openness to Change (Q1), Self-Reliance (Q2),
Perfectionism (Q3), Tension (Q4) (Russell, Cattell, Cattell, Cattell, & Karol, 1994).
The Big Five
Several other researchers attempted to replicate Cattell’s 16-factor solution, but were
unsuccessful, and in each case a 5-factor solution was found (Fiske, 1959; Tupes & Christal,
1961, Barrick & Mount, 1991). As years passed, other alternatives to Cattell’s 16-factor solution
to personality structure gained popularity, such as Eysenck’s (1991) 3-factor P-E-N model
(Psychoticism, Extraversion, Neuroticism) and Jackson’s 6-factor PRF solution (Barenbaum &
Winter, 1998). However, there was not a lot of consensus among researchers regarding
personality factor structure until the 1990s, when the “Big Five” emerged as the dominant
taxonomy. Although there has been some disagreement on the names of the Big Five factors
(Goldberg, 1993), many researchers today have settled on these five: Extraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness-to-Experience (John,
Naumann, & Soto, 2008).
Extraversion is the personality factor associated with sociability and individuals high in
this personality trait are talkative, active, and express positive emotion (Barrick & Mount, 1991;
John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). Emotional Stability is sometimes referred to in a negative
manner as Neuroticism, though there is some argument these constructs are at opposite ends of a
spectrum. Individuals high in Emotional Stability would be calm and even-tempered, whereas an
individual high in Neuroticism would be anxious or easily angered. Agreeableness is the factor
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associated with an individual’s interpersonal skills and includes traits such as altruism,
friendliness, and tolerance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). Individuals
high in Conscientiousness are responsible, organized, and hardworking. Lastly, Openness-toExperience (also known as Intellectence) is the factor associated with an individual’s willingness
to experience new things, and those high in Openness-to-Experience exhibit traits such as being
imaginative, original, and adventure-seeking (Barrick & Mount, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto,
2008).
To illustrate the dominance of the Big Five taxonomy in recent years, John, Naumann,
and Soto (2008) presented a histogram depicting the number of publications related to the Big
Five taxonomy versus the combined total of Cattell’s 16PF and Eysenck and Eysenck’s P-E-N
model in 5-year intervals starting in 1980 to the present. The Big Five taxonomy was essentially
nonexistent in 1980, but in 2006 the taxonomy was represented in over 300 articles annually; a
stark contrast to the fewer than 50 combined using the Cattell or Eysenck and Eysenck approach.
The emergence of the Big Five’s dominance in Industrial / Organizational psychology research
can be partly explained by Goldberg’s (1993) suggestion that the Big Five taxonomy could prove
a useful framework to study “personality-oriented job analyses, reliable measures of job-related
personality traits, and the optimal procedures for linking applicants’ personality with job
requirements” (p. 32).
Barrick and Mount (1991) agree with Goldberg’s position, and further posit that the Big
Five framework provides a meaningful taxonomy to formulate and test hypotheses regarding
non-cognitive individual differences. Their seminal meta-analysis examined the relationship
between personality factors and ratings of three job performance criteria (training proficiency,
job proficiency, and personnel data), and found that Conscientiousness was a predictor of ratings
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of job performance across jobs included in their meta-analysis. Additionally, they found
Extraversion predicted job performance in sales and managerial jobs, and that Extraversion and
Openness-to-Experience predicted training proficiency outcomes (Barrick & Mount, 1991).
Though job performance is one of the main criteria of I/O psychology research (some say “the
criterion”), personality factors are valid predictors of other work outcomes too, such as
Neuroticism predicting job satisfaction, burnout, and turnover (Thoreson, Kaplan, Barsky,
Warren, & de Chermont, 2003).
Facet-Level Approaches
Another approach to analyzing personality factors is to examine personality traits at the
facet level. Costa and McCrae developed the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R;
Costa & McCrae, 1992) to assess 30 personality traits, with each of the Big Five personality
factors containing six facet-level traits. As an example to elucidate the facet-level structure of the
NEO-PI-R, in Costa and McCrae’s taxonomy Agreeableness is a factor consisting of the
following six traits: Trust, Straightforwardness, Altruism, Compliance, Modesty, and TenderMindedness. The other 24 traits are split evenly among the other four Big Five personality
factors. Costa and McCrae (1992a) found good discriminant validity for the 30-trait structure
after controlling for the Big Five factors. DeYoung, Peterson, and Quilty (2007) introduced
another alternative to the Big Five that uses a facet-level taxonomy, a 10-trait facet-level
approach with each Big Five factor housing two facets. In contrast to the Costa and McCrae
taxonomy, in the DeYoung et al. (2007) taxonomy, Agreeableness is split into the two facets:
Compassion and Politeness.
Recently, debate has occurred on whether a broad or narrow approach was preferable in
personality research (Judge, Rodell, Klinger, Simon, & Crawford, 2013). When considering
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which approach to employ in research, the Judge et al. (2013) meta-analysis highlighted the need
for researchers to consider the concept of construct correspondence. Construct correspondence
refers to the relationship between the specificity of predictors and criteria. Fishbein and Ajzen
first expounded on construct correspondence in their research on attitudes predicting behavior
(Judge, et al., 2013). Fishbein and Ajzen authored the Theory of Reasoned Action, which states
that attitudes and social norms predict intentions, with intentions subsequently predicting
behavior. They argue that to maximize prediction, “attitudes must be conceptualized and
measured at the same level of specificity as the behaviors they seek to predict” (Judge et al.,
2013, p. 879). While the concept of construct correspondence was originally applied in attitudebehavior relations, it has also been applied in trait-behavior relations (Judge, et al., 2013). Judge
et al. (2013) found mixed support for construct correspondence in their meta-analysis on the
relationship between personality traits and job performance. However, one of their findings that
supports the notion of construct correspondence was that the DeYoung, et al. (2007) facets
explained more variance in task and contextual performance than in overall job performance.
Personality and Cybersecurity
Although there has been a recent upswing in research related to the cybersecurity
behaviors of employees (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Guo, 2013), there has been minimal
research conducted examining the relationship between personality factors and cybersecurity
behaviors. There are two known studies examining the relationship between personality and
cybersecurity behaviors that are currently unpublished (Dreibelbis, 2016; Martin, 2017).
Dreibelbis (2016) found that Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Openness-to-Experience
were significantly related to cybersecurity behaviors, while Martin (2017) was unable to
replicate the conscientiousness to cyber-related behavior relationship at the personality factor-
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level. The research I am proposing seeks to add to the scientific contribution of the Dreibelbis
(2016) and Martin (2017) studies by examining how personality facets predict cybersecurity
attitudes, rather than solely examining the relationships at the factor-level.
Modeling Personality Facets, Cybersecurity Attitudes, and Behavior
One of the goals of this research is test a model of the relationship between personality
facets, cybersecurity attitudes, cybersecurity climate, perceived behavioral control, and
cybersecurity behaviors. When considering whether to measure Big Five personality factors or
facet-level traits for this study, there are two factors supporting the measurement of personality
at the facet-level. First, personality will be predicting cybersecurity attitudes, which is a very
specific type of attitude. Thus, taking construct correspondence into account, a narrower measure
of personality might best predict a narrow attitude. Second, when examining the definitions for
the Big Five personality factors versus the NEO-PI-R facets, the NEO-PI-R facets make more
theoretical sense to use as predictors of cybersecurity attitudes. For example, one might have
difficulty drawing a theoretical connection between Extraversion and cybersecurity attitudes;
however, it is logical that someone who is high in the trait Positive Emotions would be “higher”
in cybersecurity attitudes than someone who is low on the trait.
For this research, I will test a model that refines the Theory of Planned Behavior into a
cybersecurity context, with locus of control, cybersecurity attitudes, and cybersecurity climate
predicting cybersecurity behaviors. The model will be further modified to examine how
personality facets predict cybersecurity attitudes.
Theoretical Framework
When researching how personality facets predict employees’ cybersecurity attitudes (and
attitudes in general), it is important to have a sound theoretical base. Ajzen’s theory of planned
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behavior expands upon the theory of reasoned action by concluding that intentions to commit
behaviors can be predicted with greater accuracy by three constructs: subjective or social norms,
attitudes toward the behavior, and perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991). When applying
the theory, Ajzen stresses the importance of measuring perceived behavioral control and not
actual behavioral control. According to Ajzen’s theory, perceived behavioral control, along with
intention, predicts future behavior. Additionally, social norms and attitudes lead to behavioral
intention. Social norms refer to the perceived social pressure to perform a coinciding behavior,
and attitude refers to the degree that a person views a behavior as favorable or unfavorable
(Ajzen, 1991). Figure 1 represents the constructs from Ajzen’s journal article The Theory of
Planned Behavior (1991).
Support for use of the theory of planned behavior for cybersecurity research can be
garnered from previous research comparing the use of the technology acceptance model versus
the theory of planned behavior when predicting intentions in the information security realm
(Mathieson, 1991). Furthermore, Siponen (2000) supports the use of the theory of planned
behavior in his conceptual paper on computer security. Moreover, empirical studies have used
the theory of planned behavior to study the Internet behavior of individuals in a home setting
(Anderson, 2005; via Herath & Rao, 2009) and to study Internet behavior and cultural
differences between Americans and South Koreans (Dinev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 2006).
Additionally, Beck and Ajzen (1991) used the theory of planned behavior to predict dishonest
behaviors such as theft and lying; behaviors that would be considered counterproductive work
behaviors if they occurred in the workplace. In an attempt to provide a more accurate fit of our
variables of interest, the model Ajzen proposed will be adapted to a cybersecurity context for the
purposes of this research. The construct “attitudes” will be adapted to “cybersecurity attitudes”,
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the construct “social norms” will be adapted to “cybersecurity climate” and “behavior” will be
changed to “cybersecurity behaviors”. Figure 2 displays a model of the theory of planned
behavior with the adapted constructs.
Personality Facets Relating to Cybersecurity Attitudes
With the conceptual adaptation of the theory of planned behavior complete, focus is
brought to the personality facets hypothesized to relate to cybersecurity attitudes. One of the
personality factors that has been previously hypothesized to relate to cybersecurity behaviors is
conscientiousness (Dreibelbis, 2016; Martin, 2017). As mentioned above, both the Dreibelbis
(2016) and Martin (2017) studies examined conscientiousness at the factor-level and found
mixed results regarding conscientiousness being able to predict cybersecurity behaviors.
Therefore, this research will focus on examining the facets of conscientiousness believed to be
most predictive of attitudes (and subsequently behavior). The facets of Conscientiousness
include Order, Dutifulness, Competence, Achievement-Striving, Self-Discipline, and
Deliberation (Costa & McCrae, 1992; via Judge et al., 2003). Descriptions of Order refers to
those who are well-organized and methodical. Individuals high in the trait Dutifulness are ethical
and governed by conscience. Descriptions of Self-Discipline include the ability to carry out tasks
and being self-motivated. Individuals high in Deliberation think carefully before acting and are
cautious (Judge et al., 2013). Theoretically, these four facets of Conscientiousness should best be
able to predict to cybersecurity attitudes, and thus are hypothesized to be positively related to
cybersecurity attitudes.
Hypothesis 1A: Order will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
Hypothesis 1B: Dutifulness will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
Hypothesis 1C: Self-Discipline will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
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Hypothesis 1D: Deliberation will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
The facets of Agreeableness include Altruism and Compliance (Costa & McCrae, 1992).
Descriptions of Altruism include being helpful, generous, and having an active concern for
others (Judge et al., 2013). Compliance can be defined as conforming to official instructions.
Individuals high in Altruism and Compliance would likely to be receptive to following
cybersecurity policies in the workplace and be more likely to adhere to policy.
Hypothesis 2A: Altruism will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
Hypothesis 2B: Compliance will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
The facets of Openness-to-Experience include Fantasy and Ideas (Costa & McCrae,
1992). The trait Fantasy describes those who are lost in thought and prone to daydreaming.
(Judge et al., 2013). Individuals high in Fantasy might eschew an organization’s policies and
have a negative attitude toward rules and policies. The trait Ideas describes someone with
intellectual curiosity and willingness to try new ideas. An individual high in Ideas might be
enthusiastic about learning cybersecurity policies and ways to combat possible cyberattacks.
Hypothesis 3A: Fantasy will be negatively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
Hypothesis 3B: Ideas will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
Positive Emotions is a facet of Extraversion, and those high in Positive Emotions exhibit
are high-spirited and optimistic (Judge et al., 2013). Individuals high in Positive Emotions would
likely have a positive attitude with regards to cybersecurity practices and have a positive attitude
in general.
Hypothesis 4: Positive Emotions will be positively related to cybersecurity attitudes.
In addition to the relationships between personality facets and cybersecurity attitudes, the
following hypothesis represents the subsequent path from cybersecurity attitudes to cybersecurity
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behavior in Ajzen’s (1991) theoretical framework for the relationship between locus of control,
social norms, attitudes, intentions, and behavior.
Hypothesis 5: Cybersecurity attitudes will be positively related to cybersecurity
behaviors.
Organizational Climate
Another variable that likely affects whether an employee commits good cybersecurity
behaviors is the worker’s organizational climate. Ehrhart, Schneider, and Macey (2014) formally
define organizational climate as “the shared meaning organizational members attach to the
events, policies, practices, and procedures they experience and the behaviors they see being
rewarded, supported, and expected”. Organizational climate, and climate research in general,
evolved from the Lewin’s Gestalt psychology experiments in the 1930s and qualitative
observations of organizational behavior in the 1960s conducted by Likert (1961) and Barker
(1965) (see also Denison, 1996). These early qualitative observations included administration of
survey instruments to employees to assess behavioral and social aspects of the workplace
(Schneider & Barbera, 2014).
One of the aspects of organizational climate that differentiates the construct from
organizational culture is the focus on quantitative analysis. Litwin and Stringer (1968)
constructed the first widely used instrument to measure organizational climate and the measure
focused on six facets of climate: risk, rewards, structure, support, tolerance, and individual
responsibility (Schneider & Barbara, 2014). The trend of using quantitative data from surveys to
measure climate continues to this day. However, unlike personality research, where a taxonomy
like the Big Five has become the dominant structure, organizational climate researchers still
debate the number of dimensions to measure, as evidenced by Patterson et al.’s (2005) recent
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work identifying a 17-factor solution. While no consensus on the dimensionality of climate has
yet been reached, one thing is consistent among researchers regarding the structure of
organizational climate: the construct is multi-dimensional.
Throughout its history, there have been three main areas of criticism with regard to
organizational climate research (Ehrhart, Schneider, and Macey, 2014). The first area of criticism
concerns the levels of analysis in climate research. Psychological climate can be defined as “the
individual differences in perceptions of work environments and the significance of these
perceptions” (Burke, Borucki, & Kaufman, 2002; Schneider & Barbera, 2014, p. 108). While
organizational climate is conceptualized as a unit, group, or organizational-level construct,
psychological climate operates at the individual level. Often times researchers administering
surveys purporting to measure organizational climate include measures of both organizational
climate and psychological climate on the same instrument. This research will focus on
cybersecurity climate as a psychological climate variable, as we will be measuring individuals
that do not belong to the same organization or team.
A second initial area of criticism regarding climate research that has since subsided is the
overlap between organizational climate and criterion such as job satisfaction (Ehrhart, Schneider,
& Macey, 2014). However, prior research (Schneider & Snyder, 1975) was able to empirically
separate the constructs with the result being climate refers to the work environment, and affect is
associated with attitudes. This separation lends support to using the theory of planned behavior
to study organizational outcomes as there is empirical support providing a clear distinction
between the two constructs, at least when they are measured properly.
The third area of criticism originated from the lack of consistent findings when
organizational climate was used as a variable to predict outcomes such as job performance
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(Hellreigel & Slocum, 1974; Ehrhart, Schneider, & Macey, 2014). While Schneider (1975)
responded to the initial critique by stating that organizational climate scales were very broad
measures and could not be expected to adequately predict specific outcomes (Ehrhart, Schneider,
& Macey, 2014), one could argue that job performance is a broad criterion and there is a
conceptual match as far as the level of specificity of the two constructs is concerned. However,
one lasting impact from Schneider’s (1975) article was his call for climate research to study
specific climates, also known as focused climates. While Schneider perhaps is credited as the
forefather of focused climate, he argues in his article that researchers had long been studying
specific climates (e.g. his example of Fleishman’s work in 1953 that was essentially an
examination of a climate for leadership).
Focused Climates (Strategic and Process)
Schneider’s approach is essentially a consideration of the aforementioned concept of
construct correspondence. Again, Fishbein and Ajzen’s work was focused primarily on the
relationship between attitudes and behavior, and they opined that behaviors are best predicted
when they are conceptualized and measured at the same level of specificity as attitudes.
Matching specificity of constructs using construct correspondence to match predictors with
criterion has occurred in other domains, including personality (Hough & Furnham, 2003; Judge,
Rodell, Klinger, Simon, & Crawford, 2013) and this study seeks to examine the concept of
construct correspondence in an organizational climate context as well.
In defining focused climates, Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey (2011) offer further
categorization: strategic and process climates. The difference between strategic and process
climates lies in what each is trying to address. Strategic climates are concerned with specifically
addressing outcomes that organizations seek to achieve (Ehrhart & Raver, 2014). Examples of
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strategic climates include the two most-studied focused climates: safety climate and service
climate. Process climates refer to those climates that are focused on internal processes that help
support the desired outcomes. An example of a process climate would be the diversity climate of
an organization (Ehrhart & Raver, 2014).
The majority of climate research today occurs in the various strategic climate domains
(Ehrhart, Schneider, & Macey, 2014). The proposed construct of this research, cybersecurity
climate, would be considered a strategic climate much in the same vein as safety climate. Safety
climate is defined as “the shared employee perceptions about the relative importance of safe
conduct in their occupational behavior” (Zohar, 1980). Safety climate has been found to be a
significant predictor of specific-level outcomes such as safety knowledge, safety participation,
and safety compliance (Griffin & Neal, 2000) and other focused climates such as service climate
also have empirical support (Johnson, 1996) in the climate literature. Thus, this study seeks to
establish a similar relationship between cybersecurity climate and cyber-related outcomes.
Cybersecurity Climate
This research will use the operationalization of cybersecurity climate that Kessler,
Pindek, Kleinman, Andel, and Spector (2016) propose: “a multidimensional construct that
consists of policies, practices, and procedures aimed at promoting the secure handling of
confidential data (p. 9).” This definition is similarly structured to the definitions of
organizational climate and safety climate, and the Kessler et al. (2016) research is itself an
application of safety climate research to a cybersecurity context. One consideration when
measuring a construct so similarly to another is that the instruments used to measure each similar
construct may lack discriminant validity. This might be a problem that exists in climate research
in general, but specifically in strategic climates when it is possible that multiple closely defined
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strategic climates are being measured simultaneously and discriminant validity is not confirmed
as part of primary studies. Recent research found that multiple strategic climates (i.e. safety
climate, violence prevention climate, and civility climate) were similarly predictive of
organizational outcomes (workplace hazards; Gazica & Spector, 2016). A secondary focus of
this research will explore this potential issue by administering a cybersecurity climate scale
along with a safety climate measure to examine whether the two climate constructs are different
from one another.
Research Question 1: Will a measure cybersecurity display discriminant validity from a measure
of safety climate (i.e. exhibit a correlation between the two measures that does not suggest
multicollinearity)?
This research question is particularly relevant for this research as the one published
instrument that measures a similar construct to cybersecurity climate was adapted directly from
safety climate scales (Chan, Woon, & Kankanhalli, 2005). Chan et al. created a 27-item
information security climate scale based on eight safety climate scales and their scale exhibited
good psychometric properties, but the authors did not check to see whether the instrument
displayed discriminant validity from the safety climate scales on which it was based. While my
research question proposes to examine the relationship between safety climate and cybersecurity
climate, my hypothesis regarding cybersecurity climate seeks to measure it as a predictor for
cybersecurity behavior, similar to Neal and Griffin’s (2004) findings that safety climate
predicted safety behavior.
Hypothesis 6: Cybersecurity climate will be positively related to cybersecurity behavior.
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Locus of Control
In addition to the hypothesized relationships between facets of personality, cybersecurity
attitudes, cybersecurity climate, and behaviors; the remaining antecedent of behavior represented
in the theory of planned behavior is the relationship between locus of control and behavior.
Locus of control is a personality variable that explains why some people attribute control of
events to themselves or to outside forces (Spector, 1988). Those who attribute control of events
to themselves are higher on internal locus of control, and those who attribute control of events to
others or the environment are high on external locus of control. Prior research has focused on
locus of control and its association with several organizational variables, including motivation,
performance, and compliance with authority (Spector, 1982). Particularly relevant to this study,
Coovert and Goldstein (1980) found internal locus of control to be positively related to attitudes
about computer use and Hawk (1989) found those who were high in external locus of control
held less positive attitudes toward computer-based information systems when user involvement
was considered.
Hypothesis 7: Locus of control will be positively related to cybersecurity behaviors.
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Chapter Two
Pilot Study – Development of the Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale
Method
The first hurdle to modeling how personality, perceived behavioral control, cybersecurity
attitudes, security climate, and behavior fit together in a cybersecurity context is that there is no
instrument to measure cybersecurity attitudes. The lack of such an instrument is the impetus for
the first part of this research – to develop a scale to measure cybersecurity attitudes. I created the
Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale (CAS) as an 8-item scale informed by literature review, an
unnamed scale created by Workman, Bommer, and Straub (2009), and one item adapted from
Herath and Rao’s (2009) Policy Compliance Intentions scale. The items were constructed using
single-statement item structure and a five-point Likert scale for response. A sample item from
the CAS is: “I feel it is necessary to use strong passwords for my applications at work.” This
version of the instrument is displayed in Appendix A.
To refine the CAS instrument before administration to a sample with all the other study’s
measures, a pilot study was conducted to analyze the underlying factor structure of the scale. A
subject matter expert was asked to review the items of the scale for redundancy and face validity.
Unable to locate the exact number of participants necessary to determine reliability of an 8-item
instrument, the scale construction parameters detailed in Spector’s Summated Rating Scale
Construction (1992) were used. Spector (1992) states that a sample of 100 – 200 is adequate for
assessing reliability of a scale. An additional rule of thumb for the number of participants needed
to conduct an exploratory factor analysis on a scale is 10 participants for every item. Using the
rule of thumb for this pilot study, a total of 80 participants would be necessary. To err on the side
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of caution, the pilot study was submitted to the University of South Florida (ID: Pro 00028710)
with a minimum of 100 participants necessary.
Since the instrument measures attitudes about cybersecurity in the workplace,
participants were limited to University of South Florida psychology students who are currently
employed and state they are aware that their organization has information security /
cybersecurity policies in place. The participants were also asked to provide their gender and age.
The survey was administered anonymously through Qualtrics and participants were able
complete the scale in approximately 5 minutes. The participants were paid 0.5 SONA points
compensation for completion of the pilot study.
Results
In March 2017, the collection of data for the pilot study was stopped by removing the
ability for potential participants to sign up for the study in SONA. A dataset with 167
participants was then exported. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on the data
using SPSS 24. Principal axis factoring was used as the extraction method for the EFA. The
original analysis did not have a clear indication of how many factors were present in the data.
There were three eigenvalues over 1 (2.06, 1.54, and 1.20), and while the scree plot did not have
much of an “elbow”, what bend there was occurred at the third eigenvalue. Further analysis was
conducted by using both direct oblimin and varimax rotation to extract a three-factor solution.
There was little difference between the solutions. Four of the items were cross-loading on
multiple factors in this solution. A two-factor solution was then extracted by using direct oblimin
and varimax rotation. Again, there was little difference between the results of the two rotation
methods. This analysis showed six items to load well on only one factor, with two of the items,
“I believe it is more important to get my work done in a timely fashion than to follow
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cybersecurity policies” (-.030 on factor 1 and .034 on factor 2) and “I feel it is inconvenient to
have different passwords at work for different applications” (.034 on factor 1 and .019 on factor
2), not loading on either factor. The remaining items that loaded on their respective factors were
examined, and conceptually the factors appeared to be “cyber policy adherence attitudes” and
“perceived vulnerability attitudes”. The EFA pattern matrix is presented in table 1.

Table 1
Pattern Matrix of the Exploratory Factor Analysis of the CAS
Factor
1
2
Item 1
.67
.12
Item 2
.94
.11
Item 3
-.03
.03
Item 4
.52
-.13
Item 5
-.13
.88
Item 6
.03
.02
Item 7
.15
.62
Item 8
-.02
.48
Study 1 Administration of the 8-item version of the CAS
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Chapter Three
Study 1 – Administration of the 6-Item CAS
Method
Once the EFA was conducted on the initial sample, I restarted the collection of data using
the new 6-item version of the scale that eliminated the two items that did not load on either factor
(Appendix B). Data collection resumed in March 2017 and the survey was available to
University of South Florida SONA participants through the remainder of the Spring 2017
semester (May 2017). A total of 452 students participated from March 2017 to May 2017. The
participants had a mean age of 21.84 years (SD = 3.53). There was a more even split for gender
than usual for SONA participants, with 66% (n = 300) of the sample female, and 34% (n = 152)
male.
Results
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the data from the 452 participants using
MPlus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). The first model tested was a correlated two-factor
structure reflected by the results of the pilot study EFA (i.e. cyber policy adherence attitudes
correlated with perceived vulnerability attitudes). The model fit indices for this model are as
follows: c2 = 39.15, df = 8, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.09 [0.07, 0.12], CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.84,
SRMR = 0.06. The one-factor model (i.e. overall cybersecurity attitudes) was examined next and
had the following fit indices: c2 = 105.86, df = 9, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.15 [0.13, 0.18], CFI =
0.74, TLI = 0.57, SRMR = 0.09. These results indicate that the one-factor model fit the data
much worse than the correlated two-factor model. However, some of the fit indices of the twofactor model were still less than commonly accepted rules of thumb. In particular, the TLI = 0.84
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was a bit low and the RMSEA = 0.09 was a bit high. Therefore, I wrote two additional items for
each factor that attempted to measure policy adherence and perceived vulnerability instead of a
general cybersecurity attitude.
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Chapter Four
Study 2 – Administration of the 10-item version of the CAS
Method
This new 10-item version of the scale was ready to administer to a new sample. The two
new “cyber policy adherence” items are “I feel it is in my best interest to follow my
organization’s cybersecurity policies” and “I feel it is in my employer’s best interest to hire
individuals who follow the organization’s cybersecurity policies”. The two “perceived
vulnerability” items are “I feel it is possible that an employee browsing the Internet could lead to
a cyberattack at my organization” and “I feel I am vulnerable to my personal information being
stolen from my organization in a cyberattack”.
Participants
Data collection to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis on the new 10-item version of
the CAS began in the fall 2017 semester. The survey was available to SONA participants
through November 2017. After removal of responses from participants who did not complete the
instrument, 287 students participated in this portion of the study. The participants were 74.6% (n
= 214) female and 25.1% (n = 72) male, with one respondent not answering the question (n = 1,
0.3%). The average age of the participants was 21.09 years (SD = 3.97).
Results
I conducted a correlated two-factor model confirmatory factor analysis on this data and
found the following model fit indices: χ2 = 75.90, df = 34, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.07 [0.05, 0.09],
CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.97, SRMR = 0.05. I then conducted a single-factor confirmatory factoranalysis on this data as well, and the model fit indices were as follows: χ2 = 846.87, df = 35, p <
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0.01, RMSEA = 0.28 [0.27, 0.30], CFI = 0.52, TLI = 0.39, SRMR = 0.23. The correlated twofactor model fit the data much better than the one-factor model, which I expected since I wrote
four of the 10 items with the two factors in mind for this part of the study. A comparison of the
fit indices is below in Table 2.

Table 2
Comparison of the four models tested with confirmatory factor analysis
Model
χ2
df
p
RMSEA CFI
6-item 1-factor
105.86
9
0.00
0.15
0.74
6-item correlated 2-factor
39.15
8
0.00
0.09
0.92
10-item 1-factor
846.87
35
0.00
0.28
0.52
10-item correlated 2-factor
75.90
34
0.00
0.07
0.98

TLI
0.57
0.84
0.39
0.97

SRMR
0.09
0.06
0.23
0.05

The improved model fit indices of the 10-item correlated two-factor model were above
commonly established rule-of-thumb thresholds (e.g. CFI > 0.95, TLI > 0.95). Furthermore, the
factor loadings indicated the items loaded well on their respective factor (ranging from 0.55 to
0.90) and are detailed in Table 3. With excellent factor structure and fit indices indicating the
two-factor model fit the data well, I concluded the Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale was ready to
administer to a new sample of participants for the second phase of this research.

Table 3
Factor loadings for the correlated 2-factor model
Factor
Item
Policy Adherence
1
Policy Adherence
2
Policy Adherence
3
Policy Adherence
4
Policy Adherence
5
Perceived Vulnerability
6
Perceived Vulnerability
7
Perceived Vulnerability
8
Perceived Vulnerability
9
Perceived Vulnerability
10
27

Loading
0.55
0.83
0.85
0.85
0.86
0.71
0.84
0.90
0.79
0.72

Chapter 5
Study 3 – Modeling Cybersecurity Attitudes and Behavior
The two primary goals for this phase of my research are to test a model of the
relationship between personality facets, cybersecurity attitudes (i.e. cyber policy adherence and
perceived vulnerability), cybersecurity climate, perceived behavioral control, and cybersecurity
behavior, and to determine whether this model is equivalent across two independent populations.
Recently, organizations have put an emphasis on hiring cybersecurity and highly technical
employees, especially in the private sector (Bergal, 2015). While many different occupations
involve computer use and many are technical by nature, I am interested if differences exist
between workers whose job it is to protect an organization’s data and other occupations.
Recently, Martin’s (2017) study found work experience with computers to be a significant
predictor of optimal cybersecurity behavior, with 8.5% of her sample currently working or
previously working as cybersecurity / information security (IS) workers. However, all employees
of an organization can be targeted using social engineering techniques, thus I tested whether
there are measurement differences in the proposed model fit between cybersecurity / IS
employees and non-cybersecurity / IS employees.
Method
Measures
Personality
Each of the 9 facets hypothesized to have a relationship with cybersecurity attitudes were
measured using the 10-item International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) scales based on the NEO
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facets available at http://ipip.ori.org/newNEOFacetsKey.htm (Goldberg, 1999; Appendix B). The
9 facets measured were Order, Dutifulness, Self-Discipline, Deliberation, Altruism, Compliance,
Fantasy, Ideas, and Positive Emotions. The reliability of the 10 NEO-based facet scales range
from α = 0.71 to α = 0.88. Additionally, the Big Five personality factors (Extraversion,
Conscientiousness, Openness-to-Experience, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) were measured
using the 10-item IPIP Big-Five Factor Markers short scales available at
http://ipip.ori.org/newBigFive5broadKey.htm (Goldberg, 1999; Appendix C).
Cybersecurity Attitudes
Cybersecurity Attitudes were measured using the 10-item instrument (Appendix C) that
was developed in phase one of this research. The scale measured two facets of cybersecurity
attitudes: cyber policy adherence and perceived vulnerability. Item reliability analysis was
conducted on the two facets separately, with the five items for policy adherence showing
acceptable internal consistency reliability (α = 0.80) in this sample, as did the five items for
perceived vulnerability (α = 0.86).
Cybersecurity Climate
Cybersecurity climate was measured using the 11-item instrument developed by Kessler
et al. (under review; Appendix E). The survey included items for the following three climate
areas: practices, values, and laxness. The internal consistency reliability of the instrument in this
study was α = 0.82. A sample item from the scale is “Issues related to the protection of private
data are discussed in my workplace.” I obtained permission to use the scale in this research from
the first author.
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Safety Climate
Safety climate was measured using the NIOSH short scale for measuring safety climate
(Hahn & Murphy, 2008; Appendix F). The internal consistency reliability of the instrument was
α = 0.87 in this study. A sample item from the scale is “The health and safety of workers is a
high priority with management where I work.”
Locus of Control
Locus of control was measured by a 3-item perceived behavioral control scale (Appendix
G) that was adapted from Rotter (1966). (Workman, Bommer, and Straub, 2008). The scale
exhibited high internal consistency reliability (α = 0.88) in prior studies, however, in this study
the internal consistency reliability was quite low (α = 0.61). A sample item from this scale is
“The primary responsibility for protecting my confidential information belongs to myself.”
Cybersecurity Behaviors
Cybersecurity behaviors was measured using a scale that was adapted from Hearth and
Rao’s (2009) 3-item scale that measures cybersecurity intentions (Appendix H). The original
scale exhibits excellent psychometric properties, as the factor loadings of the three items ranged
from 0.87 to 0.94. In this study, the internal consistency reliability of the adapted scale was α =
0.90.
Attention Check
The following question was used as an attention check for this study. "Recent research on
decision making shows that choices are affected by context. Differences in how people feel, their
previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect choices. To help us
understand how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. Specifically,
we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results
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may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read
the instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead check
the "None of the above" option as your answer.” This attention check was placed in the survey
battery in the middle of the personality variables in an effort to best hide its proper usage.
Procedure
I collected data from two independent samples, cybersecurity / IT workers and non-IT
workers. I recruited participants for the two samples through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). MTurk has premium qualifications available for researchers to specialize the type of
participants they want to use. For the IT worker sample, the premium qualification “employment
status – software and information technology” was added as a prerequisite to participate in the
study. Once this sample was collected, these MTurk workers were excluded from participating
again in this research, as I blocked all participants from retaking the Mturk survey. The second
sample was then collected by removing the premium qualification. All participants were limited
to those currently employed and those who stated they are aware that their organization has
information security / cybersecurity policies in place.
The participants were informed prior to taking the study that the research was anonymous
with no linking information to their identity. The survey battery the participants completed asked
them to provide the following demographics information: gender, age, race, annual income. The
participants were then asked to complete the assessment battery consisting of the measures listed
above (Appendix C-I). The total time necessary to take the study was approximately 15-20
minutes. I was able to take the study in six minutes by going as fast as possible while still
reading the items. Therefore, I made the decision a priori to exclude all participants who finished
the survey in under six minutes (though they were still compensated for participating if they did
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not fail the manipulation check). The participants were each paid $1.25 for participating. In
determining a necessary sample size for a study that uses structural equation modeling, it is
important to examine how many measured variables, latent variables, and free parameters are
present in the model being tested. In my full model, there is a total of 122 measured variables
and 15 latent variables. MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) present a table to determine
the sufficient sample size necessary to achieve desired power. For a study with at least 100
degrees of freedom, a sample size of 200 is sufficient for both measures of exact fit (power =
.904) and close fit (power = .955). Since the models that will be examined in this study all have
far more than 100 degrees of freedom, I proposed a sample of 200 participants for each of the
two populations (IT vs. non-IT), for a total of 400 participants.
Participants
A total of 433 participants were recruited through MTurk. Prior to data analysis, a total of
56 participants were removed because they either stated that they were unemployed, or they
finished the entire survey battery in less than six minutes. The participants were also presented
with the attention check question similar to the question used in Martin (2017). This question
asked about the participants’ emotions, but at the end of the question stem stated to choose “none
of the above”. Only one participant failed the attention check, and this participant also finished in
less than 6 minutes. This left a total of 377 participants for data analysis.
One item asked the participants for their job title, and after confirming they were either
an IT or related job or not, there were 193 IT-related / software workers and 184 non-IT workers.
There were 209 (55.4%) male participants and 166 (44%) female participants, with one
participant choosing “other”, but declining to specify, and one not answering. The average age of
the participants was 37.78 years (SD = 11.71). The majority of the participants were full-time
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workers (n = 312, 82.8%). The participants were highly educated, with 71.1% (n = 268) having
completed post-high school education, including 199 (53%) that completed at least a 4-year
undergraduate degree. The annual household income of the participants varied quite a bit, with
40 (10.6%) earning under $25,000 annually, 115 (30.5%) earning between $25,000 and $49,999,
102 (27.1%) earning between $50,000 and $74,999, 47 (12.5%) earning between $75,000 and
$99,999, 44 (11.7%) earning between $100,000 and $150,000, 15 (4.0%) earning over $150,000,
and 14 (3.7%) preferring to not state their income. The participants were highly technically
proficient, as they were asked to “please indicate your level of proficiency with computers and
the Internet, and not a single person chose “very little to no proficiency”, while 91.5% (n = 345)
indicated they were either “very proficient” or “extremely proficient”. Furthermore, 79.6% (n =
300) of the participants had “definitely” helped someone fix a computer.
Results
The first 5 hypotheses of this research were related to examining the bivariate
relationship between personality facets and cybersecurity attitudes. When first hypothesized, the
personality facets were theorized to have a relationship with overall cybersecurity attitudes.
Since the structure of the cybersecurity attitudes instrument was shown to reflect two factors, the
bivariate correlations of the personality facets were measured with both cyber policy adherence
and perceived vulnerability, and if the expected relationship was significant between a facet and
both attitudes then the hypothesis was deemed fully supported. If the facet had a significant
relationship with only one attitude then the hypothesis was deemed partially supported, and if no
significant relationship existed then the hypothesis was considered not supported. The two
cybersecurity attitudes factors (i.e. policy adherence and perceived vulnerability) were
significantly positively correlated (r = 0.28, p < 0.01).

33

Orderliness was positively related to policy adherence (r = 0.18, p < 0.01), but not
significantly related to perceived vulnerability (r = 0.06, p = 0.23), therefore hypothesis 1A was
partially supported. Dutifulness was positively related to both policy adherence (r = 0.45, p <
0.01) and perceived vulnerability (r = 0.20, p < 0.01), therefore hypothesis 1B was fully
supported. Self-discipline was positively related to both policy adherence (r = 0.27, p < 0.01) and
perceived vulnerability (r = 0.12, p < 0.05), therefore hypothesis 1C was fully supported.
Deliberation was positively related to both policy adherence (r = 0.26, p < 0.01) and perceived
vulnerability (r = 0.13, p < 0.05), therefore hypothesis 1D was fully supported. Overall, three of
the four conscientiousness facets that were hypothesized to have a positive relationship with
cybersecurity attitudes did in fact have that relationship with both cybersecurity attitudes factors,
and the one that did not (i.e. orderliness) did have a positive relationship with policy adherence.
These results provide support that there is a positive relationship between the hypothesized facets
of conscientiousness and cybersecurity attitudes. However, it is interesting that there was a
stronger relationship between all four conscientiousness facets and policy adherence than with
perceived vulnerability (see table 4).

Table 4.
Correlations of Conscientiousness Facets with Cybersecurity Attitudes Factors
Policy Adherence
Perceived Vulnerability
Orderliness
.18**
.06
Dutifulness
.45**
.20**
Self-Discipline
.27**
.12*
Deliberation
.26**
.13*
Note: * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.10

When examining the facets of agreeableness, altruism was positively related to both
policy adherence (r = 0.38, p < 01) and perceived vulnerability (r = 0.13, p < 0.05), therefore
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hypothesis 2A was fully supported. Compliance was also positively related to policy adherence
(r = 0.36, p < 0.01) and perceived vulnerability (r = 0.12, p < 0.05), therefore hypothesis 2B was
fully supported. These results provide support that there is a positive relationship between the
hypothesized facets of agreeableness and cybersecurity attitudes.
Fantasy was not related to either policy adherence (r = 0.08, p = 0.12) or perceived
vulnerability (r = 0.09, p = 0.09), therefore hypothesis 3A was not supported. Intellect (Ideas)
was positively related to both policy adherence (r = 0.27, p < 0.01) and perceived vulnerability (r
= 0.14, p < 0.01), therefore hypothesis 3B was fully supported. I obtained mixed results
regarding the facets of openness-to-experience that I hypothesized would relate to cybersecurity
attitudes. Positive emotions were positively related to policy adherence (r = 0.14, p < 0.01), but
not significantly related to perceived vulnerability (0.08, p = 0.15). Therefore, hypothesis 4 was
only partially supported.
The relationship between cybersecurity attitudes and cybersecurity behaviors was
interesting, as there was a strong positive relationship between policy adherence and
cybersecurity behaviors (r = 0.56, p < 0.01), and a positive, though much smaller, relationship
between perceived vulnerability and cybersecurity behaviors (r = 0.20, p < 0.01). With both
relationships being significantly positive, hypothesis 5 was fully supported. However, it is
notable that the magnitude of the relationships is quite different. Cybersecurity climate and
cybersecurity behaviors were strongly positively related (r = 0.58, p < 0.01), providing support
for hypothesis 6; while internal locus of control was also positively related to cybersecurity
behaviors (r = 0.41, p < 0.01) providing support for hypothesis 7.
Regarding research question 1, there was a strong correlation between safety climate and
cybersecurity climate (r = 0.56, p < 0.01). While these constructs are related, I would interpret
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this correlation as support that the variables are not the same construct, but it does appear that the
cybersecurity climate construct is strongly related to safety climate in the manner the two
constructs are currently being measured. Furthermore, the two constructs seem to be similarly
related to criterion variables, as cyber climate was positively related to cybersecurity behaviors (r
= 0.58, p < 0.01), while safety climate was also strongly related to cybersecurity behaviors (r =
0.46, p < 0.01).
The structural model (figure 3) that I expected to have the best fit was tested in MPlus 7.3
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). Regarding exogenous variables, dutifulness, compliance, and
altruism were negatively skewed and had high values of kurtosis, and for endogenous variables,
cybersecurity behaviors were highly negatively skewed (see table 5).
Table 5.
Descriptives of study’s variables
Variable
Cyber Adherence Policy
Perceived Vulnerability
Cybersecurity Climate
Orderliness
Dutifulness
Self-Discipline
Deliberation
Altruism
Compliance
Fantasy
Intellect
Positive Emotions
Locus of Control
Cybersecurity Behaviors

Mean
23.02
20.07
42.40
37.92
43.10
37.31
38.83
41.07
40.57
37.12
39.93
36.84
11.52
13.63

SD
2.56
4.24
7.26
7.91
5.31
8.63
7.30
6.44
6.91
8.34
7.41
7.98
2.35
1.94

Min
11
5
21
11
22
10
16
15
12
10
10
10
3
5

Max
25
25
55
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
15
15

Variables with high kurtosis values and non-normality are particularly problematic in
structural equation modeling, thus, Satorra-Bentler corrections were used in the structural
equation modeling analysis. This is performed by using the “Estimator = MLM” and “Listwise =
on” commands in MPlus. This correction provides robust estimates of the CFI, TLI, and RMSEA
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regardless of non-normality (Byrne, 2012; p. 100). One consideration when using the SatorraBentler correction is that the chi-square value cannot be interpreted in the same manner and
cannot be used for traditional chi-square difference testing. The model fit indices for the original
model are as follows: χ2 = 14,871.11, df = 6592, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.06 [0.059, 0.061], CFI =
0.68, TLI = 0.67, SRMR = 0.09. These results indicate the model is a poor fit for the data,
especially with such low values for the CFI and TLI. This model with only the significant beta
and gamma weight paths obtained from this analysis is displayed in Figure 4.
Many of the paths that represented significant bivariate correlations became nonsignificant in this analysis. Furthermore, deliberation and positive emotion had a negative
relationship with policy adherence in this model and compliance had a negative relationship with
perceived vulnerability after having a positive relationship when examining correlations
separately. Furthermore, there was not a significant path from perceived vulnerability to cyber
behaviors, and only two conscientiousness paths (orderliness and dutifulness) were significant in
this model. Figure 5 displays the alternative model, which has a path going from locus of control
to policy adherence and perceived vulnerability instead of cybersecurity behaviors. This model
was based on the non-significant path in Ajzen’s (1985) original model. This model also was a
poor fit for the data, with nearly identical fit indices to the original hypothesized model: χ2 =
14,581.22, df = 6591, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.06 [0.058, 0.061], CFI = 0.68, TLI = 0.67, SRMR =
0.09.
Model assessment was then conducted on the models exchanging the personality facets
for the four factors that housed the facets: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
openness-to-experience. Contrary to the a priori expected results, the model had some better fit
indices (i.e. CFI and TLI) than by measuring using the facets. The fit indices for this model are
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as follows: χ2 = 4804.55, df = 1679, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.07 [0.068, 0.073], CFI = 0.78, TLI =
0.77, SRMR = 0.08. Though the model fit the data poorly, the CFI and TLI were improved over
the model based on personality facets. An exploratory model using just conscientiousness and
agreeableness as factors predicting policy adherence attitudes and perceived vulnerability had the
best CFI and TLI among models tested: χ2 = 2898.02, df = 842, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.08
[0.077,0.083], CFI = 0.79, TLI = 0.77, SRMR=0.09; though this model still exhibits poor fit.
Though the hypothesized model was a poor fit for the data, as was the alternative model,
one of the goals of this research was to test the measurement invariance of the proposed models.
Keeping in mind that several variables are non-normal, that there is multivariate non-normality,
and that the model has poor fit, I still examined configural invariance in the hypothesized model.
The first attempt was using MLM as the estimator and there was no convergence. Further testing
using maximum likelihood as the estimator was conducted, and again there was no convergence.
Exploratory Results
Because the hypothesized model and the alternative model that incorporated personality
facets were both poor fit for the data and the configural measurement invariance test would not
converge, I decided to conduct exploratory analysis on the data. First, I tested removing all the
personality facets from the model except for the conscientiousness facets to examine how the fit
indices would change. Since conscientiousness has been found to be significantly related to
many organizational behaviors such as job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991), interpersonal
and organizational deviance (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2017), and cooperative behavior in the
workplace (LePine & Van Dyne, 2001), I left the conscientiousness facets in the model because
they make the most sense conceptually to be related to cybersecurity attitudes, especially with
policy adherence. Using MLM as the estimator, the model fit indices were as follows: χ2 =
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5749.67, df = 2117, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.07 [0.066, 0.071], CFI = 0.73, TLI = 0.72, SRMR =
0.09. These fit indices signal that this is still a poor fit for the data.
Next, I removed the personality facets completely from the model, and conducted an
analysis on only the cyber analogs to the theory of planned behavior (minus intentions). This
model still exhibited poor fit indices, and less fit than keeping the conscientiousness facets in the
model: χ2 = 1567.82, df = 314, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.10 [0.099, 0.109], CFI = 0.70, TLI = 0.67,
SRMR = 0.10. This model was a poor fit for the data, and further examination of the
modification indices showed that there were several residuals among the cybersecurity climate
scale that were exceptionally high (e.g., 150-200). There is no theoretical justification for
correlating residuals, therefore I left the model as is, but it was informative seeing the
modification indices with a manageable number in the MPlus output. Next, I aggregated the
items for each variable and ran a path analysis on the “measured” variables. This model had the
worst fit of all the models: χ2 = 123.11, df = 14, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.15 [0.13, 0.17], CFI =
0.73, TLI = 0.32, SRMR = 0.06.
Lastly, I standardized all of the individual items to z scores and conducted structural
equation modeling analysis on the transformed scores, using MLM for an estimator and only
allowing the personality facets to be correlated with other facets in their respective factor. Some
of the model fit indices (e.g. CFI and TLI) were slightly improved from the hypothesized model,
but overall this model was still a poor fit for the data: χ2 = 11011.43, df = 5087, p = 0.00,
RMSEA = 0.06 [0.062, 0.066], CFI = 0.75, TLI = 0.74, SRMR = 0.11.
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Table 6.
Model Fit Indices for All Models Tested in Analysis
χ2
df
RMSEA
Hypothesized Models
Full Model
14,871.11 6592
0.06
Alternative Model
14,851.22 6591
0.06
Factors Model
4804.55
1679
0.07
Exploratory Models
Factors (Con&Agree)
2898.02
842
0.08
Con Facets Only
5749.67
2117
0.07
No Personality
1567.82
314
0.10
Path Analysis
123.11
14
0.15
Z Scores
11,011.43 5087
0.06
Note: Con = Conscientiousness, Agree = Agreeableness

40

RMSEA CI

CFI

TLI

SRMR

[.059, .061]
[.058, .061]
[.068, .073]

0.68
0.69
0.78

0.67
0.68
0.77

0.09
0.09
0.08

[.077, .083]
[.066, .071]
[.099, .109]
[.13, .17]
[.062,.066]

0.79
0.73
0.70
0.73
0.75

0.77
0.72
0.67
0.32
0.74

0.09
0.09
0.10
0.06
0.11

Chapter Six
Discussion
There were two parts to this study – the development of the cybersecurity attitudes scale,
and the examination of the relationship the cybersecurity attitudes construct has with other
variables by examining the bivariate correlations between the study’s variables, and then in the
context of a structural model. Through a three-step iterative process, I was able to develop an
instrument to measure cybersecurity attitudes. While the intent of this research at the outset was
to examine general cybersecurity attitudes, results of the administration of the initial instrument
(Appendix A) suggested that there were two factors being measured. Examining the items that
loaded on the two factors indicated that the factors being measured were cyber policy adherence
attitudes and perceived vulnerability to a cyberattack. After two subsequent administrations of
revised versions of the Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale, a finalized version of the scale displaying
good psychometric properties remained (i.e. Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.80 and all factor
loadings on respective factors greater than 0.50).
Minimizing or eliminating risky employee cybersecurity behaviors is a priority for
organizations in today’s work environment. Development of a scale that measures employees’
attitudes regarding cybersecurity could be considered a key practical step in assisting
organizations attempting to ameliorate cyber behaviors that have negative consequences.
Broadly speaking, there is a plethora of empirical evidence that support the view that attitudes
can predict future behavior (e.g., Kraus, 1995), and this relationship between attitudes and
behavior has been shown to also be true in the organizational sciences (e.g., the relationship
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between turnover intentions resulting from disaffect with an employer and subsequent turnover;
Vanderberg & Nelson, 1999). Thus, the CAS can have practical benefits for organizational
researchers seeking to better understand why employees continue to behave in ways that put an
organization’s data at risk.
The positive bivariate correlations that many of the personality facets have with cyber
policy adherence attitudes and perceived vulnerability support further examination of the
relationship between these facets and cyber attitudes. However, the results of this study appear to
indicate that the relationship between personality facets and attitudes differ whether you examine
the policy adherence relationship or the perceived vulnerability relationship. The two attitudinal
factors positively correlated with each other (r = 0.28, p < 0.01). However, that relationship is
small enough to suggest that while they are certainly related, they might be different attitudes. As
mentioned above, the conscientiousness facets (i.e. orderliness, dutifulness, self-discipline, and
deliberation) were all correlated more strongly with policy adherence than perceived
vulnerability (see table 4).
These results may help explain why Dreibelbis (2016) found a relationship between
conscientiousness and cyber misbehavior, Hu et al. (2012) found a relationship between
dutifulness and cybersecurity intentions, and Martin (2017) was unable to find a significant
relationship between conscientiousness and cybersecurity behavior. Following the results of Hu
et al. (2012), this research found the dutifulness facet to have the strongest relationship with both
cybersecurity attitudes. On the other hand, orderliness had a much smaller relationship with
policy adherence than dutifulness and had no significant relationship with perceived
vulnerability. If the conscientiousness items that measured the orderliness, competence, and
achievement-striving were attenuating the relationship with cybersecurity behaviors, that could
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account for the reason Martin (2017) had difficulty obtaining results similar to Dreibelbis (2016).
Perhaps solely measuring the conscientiousness facets that have the strongest relationships with
attitudes, intentions, and behavior would be a fruitful next step for researchers to take.
The structural equation model hypothesized to be the best fit for the data was not
plausible, nor were any of the alternative models. There may be a couple of reasons why these
models were a poor fit for the data. The first reason is there was barely any variance in the
cybersecurity behavior variable (the right-most endogenous variable in the model), as 56.2% (n =
212) chose “strongly agree” with all 3 items on the scale. This variable had a skewness of -1.54
(standard error = 0.13) and a kurtosis of 2.30 (standard error = 0.25). Furthermore, several
exogenous variables (i.e. dutifulness, compliance, altruism) were also negatively skewed.
I suspect that some of the negative skew of these variables occurred due to the use of
MTurk workers for this study. The MTurk workers were extremely technically proficient and
were also a highly conscientious and agreeable sample. I think it is quite possible there would be
a lot more variance in the study’s variables if an organizational sample of workers was used to
conduct the research. Another possible method to combat the “socially desirable” answers would
have been to administer a social desirability scale with the survey battery. Though it is possible
that professional survey participants know how to respond to social desirability scales as well
since they make income from participating in survey research.
Likewise, I should have had multiple attention checks. The attention check used in this
research was based on the one used in the Martin (2017) study. However, Martin (2017) had a
sizable percentage (roughly 10%) of participants fail the attention check, while I only had one
participant answer the attention check incorrectly. Another limitation of this study was the study
design. The hypothesized models in this study suggest that cybersecurity attitudes mediates the
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relationship between personality facets and cybersecurity behaviors. However, the study was a
cross-sectional design, with self-report survey data collected at only one timepoint. To truly test
for mediating effects, a researcher would want to use a longitudinal design to better understand
causal effects.
Conclusion
Cybersecurity misbehaviors are having an increasingly costly effect on present-day
organizations and understanding the mechanisms underlying why employees continue to have
suboptimal cybersecurity behaviors is an important research domain. This study adds to the
extant literature in the nascent cybersecurity and industrial-organizational psychology domain
with the development of a scale that researchers can use to measure an individual’s cybersecurity
attitudes across two dimensions: cyber policy adherence attitudes and perceived vulnerability to
a cyberattack. The three-step iterative process using independent samples resulted in a scale that
displays good psychometric properties. The resultant Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale is of
practical use to academic researchers and hopefully to organizations as well. This research also
found there to be a strong bivariate relationship between cyber policy adherence attitudes and
dutifulness, altruism, compliance and cybersecurity climate. The bivariate relationship between
perceived vulnerability and these variables was significant, but to a lesser degree, so future
research may want to examine how personality factors and/or facets differentially predict
different cybersecurity attitudes and subsequent intentions and behaviors. Finally, the
hypothesized models of personality facets, attitudes, climate, locus of control, and behavior
exhibited poor fit for the data collected in this sample. However, future research using an
organizational sample, or a sample that has a large amount of variance in this study’s variables
may find more support for the hypothesized models used in this study.

44

References
Abraham, S., & Chengalur-Smith, I. (2010). An overview of social engineering malware:
Trends, tactics, and implications. Technology in Society, 32(3), 183-196.
Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior (pp. 11-39). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 50(2), 179-211.
Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological
Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211).
Anderson, C. (2005). Creating conscientious cybercitizen: an examination of home computer
user attitudes and intentions towards security, Presented at Conference on Information
Systems Technology (CIST)/INFORMS, 2005, San Francisco, California
Arena, C. (2014, August 13). 4 Reasons Why Exponential Technologies Are Taking Off.
Retrieved November 19, 2015.
Ashton, K. (2009). That ‘internet of things’ thing. RFiD Journal, 22(7), 97-114.
Barenbaum, N. B., & Winter, D.G. (2008). History of modern personality theory and research.
Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 3-28.
Barker, R. G. (1965). Explorations in ecological psychology. American Psychologist, 20(1), 1.
Barrett, D., Yadron, D., & Paletta, D. (2015). U.S. suspects hackers in China breached about 4
million people's records, officials ssay. Retrieved November 20, 2015, from

45

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-suspects-hackers-in-china-behind-government-databreach-sources-say-1433451888
Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and job
performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26.
Beck, L., & Ajzen, I. (1991). Predicting dishonest actions using the theory of planned behavior.
Journal of Research in Personality, 25(3), 285-301.
Bergal, J. (2015). Hiring cybersecurity staff is hard for states. Retrieved November 25, 2015,
from http://www.govtech.com/security/Hiring-Cybersecurity-Staff-Is-Hard-forStates.html
Berry, C. M., Ones, D. S., & Sackett, P. R. (2007). Interpersonal deviance, organizational
deviance, and their common correlates: A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 92(2), 410.
Bilker, W. B., Hansen, J. A., Brensinger, C. M., Richard, J., Gur, R. E., & Gur, R. C. (2012).
Development of abbreviated nine-item forms of the Raven’s Standard Progressive
Matrices Test. Assessment, 19(3), 354-369.
Bort, J. (2014). How the hackers broke into Sony and why it could happen to any company.
Retrieved November 28, 2015, from http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-hackersbroke-into-sony-2014-12
Briggs, B., & Shingles, M. (2015). Tech Trends 2015, Exponentials. Retrieved May 01, 2016,
from http://dupress.com/articles/tech-trends-2015-exponential-technologies/
Burke, M. J., Borucki, C. C., & Kaufman, J. D. (2002). Contemporary perspectives on the study
of psychological climate: A commentary. European Journal of Work and Organizational
Psychology, 11, 325– 340.

46

Byrne, B. M. (2012). Structural equation modeling with Mplus. [electronic resource]: basic
concepts, applications, and programming. New York : Routledge, 2012.
Cattell, R. B. (1943). The description of personality: Basic traits resolved into clusters. The
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 38(4), 476-506. doi:10.1037/h0054116
Cattell, R. B. (1963). Theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence: A critical experiment. Journal
of Educational Psychology, 54(1), 1.
Chan, M., Woon, I., & Kankanhalli, A. (2005). Perceptions of information security in the
workplace: Linking information security climate to compliant behavior. Journal of
Information Privacy and Security, 1(3), 18-41.
Coovert, M. D., & Goldstein, M. (1980). Locus of control as a predictor of users' attitude toward
computers. Psychological Reports, 47(3_suppl), 1167-1173.
Costa, P. T, Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four ways five factors are basic. Personality and
Individual Differences, 13, 653-665.
Costa, P. T, Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) and
NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment
Resources.
Denison, D. R. (1996). What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational
climate? A native's point of view on a decade of paradigm wars. Academy of
Management Review, 21(3), 619-654.
DeYoung, C. G., Peterson, J. B., & Quilty, L. C. (2007). Between facets and domains: 10 aspects
of the Big Five. Journal Of Personality and Social Psychology, (5), 880.
Dinev, T., Goo, J., Hu, Q., & Nam, K. (2006). User behavior toward preventive technologies–
cultural differences between the United States and South Korea.

47

Dorsey, D. W., Martin, J., Howard, D. J., & Coovert, M. D. (2017). Cybersecurity issues in
selection. In Farr, J. L. & Tippins, N. T. (Eds.), Handbook of employee selection (pp.
913–930). New York, NY: Routledge
Dreibelbis, R. (2016). It’s more than Just Changing Your Password: Exploring the Nature and
Antecedents of Cyber-Security Behaviors.
Ehrhart, M. G., & Raver, J. L. (2014). The effects of organizational climate and culture on
productive and counterproductive behavior. The Oxford handbook of organizational
climate and culture, 153-176.
Ehrhart, M. G., Schneider, B., & Macey, W. H. (2014). Organizational climate and culture: an
introduction to theory, research, and practice. New York, NY : Routledge, 2014.
Erbschloe, M. (2005). Trojans, worms, and spyware. [electronic resource] : a computer security
professional's guide to malicious code. Amsterdam : Boston : Elsevier Butterworth
Heinemann, c2005.
Eysenck, H. J. (1991). Dimensions of personality: 16, 5, or 3? Criteria for a taxonomic paradigm.
Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 773-790.
Fiske, D. W. (1949). Consistency of the factorial structures of personality ratings from different
sources. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 44, 329-344.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1974). Attitudes towards objects as predictors of single and multiple
behavioral criteria. Psychological Review, 81, 59–74.
Gazica, M. W., & Spector, P. E. (2016). A test of safety, violence prevention, and civility climate
domain-specific relationships with relevant workplace hazards. International Journal of
Occupational and Environmental Health, 22(1), 45-51.

48

Goldberg, L. R. (1993). The structure of phenotypic personality traits. The American
Psychologist, (1), 26.
Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, public domain, personality inventory measuring the
lower-level facets of several five-factor models. In I. Mervielde, I. Deary, F. De Fruyt, &
F. Ostendorf (Eds.), Personality Psychology in Europe, Vol. 7 (pp. 7-28). Tilburg, The
Netherlands: Tilburg University Press.
Grant Thornton (2015). Cyber attacks cost global business over $300bn a year. Retrieved
November 19, 2015, from http://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/articles/cyberattacks-cost-global-business-over-$300bn-a-year/
Greenberg, A. (2015). OPM now admits 5.6m Feds’ fingerprints were stolen by hackers.
Retrieved November 19, 2015, from http://www.wired.com/2015/09/opm-now-admits-56m-feds-fingerprints-stolen-hackers/
Griffin, M. A., & Neal, A. (2000). Perceptions of safety at work: a framework for linking safety
climate to safety performance, knowledge, and motivation. Journal of Occupational
Health Psychology, 5(3), 347.
Gubbi, J., Buyya, R., Marusic, S., & Palaniswami, M. (2013). Internet of Things (IoT): A vision,
architectural elements, and future directions. Future generation computer systems, 29(7),
1645-1660.
Guo, K. (2013). Security-related behavior in using information systems in the workplace: A
review and synthesis. Computers & Security 32, 242-251.
Guo K., Yuan Y., Archer N., Connelly C. (2011). Understanding nonmalicious security
violations in the workplace: A composite behavior model. Journal Of Management
Information Systems 28(2):203-236.

49

Hahn, S. E., & Murphy, L. R. (2008). A short scale for measuring safety climate. Safety Science,
46(7), 1047-1066.
Hawk, S. R. (1989). Locus of control and computer attitude: The effect of user involvement.
Computers in Human Behavior, 5(3), 199-206.
Hellriegel, D., & Slocum, J. W. (1974). Organizational climate: Measures, research and
contingencies. Academy of Management Journal, 17(2), 255-280.
Herath, T., & Rao, H. R. (2009). Encouraging information security behaviors in organizations:
Role of penalties, pressures and perceived effectiveness. Decision Support Systems,
47(2), 154-165.
Hough, L. M., & Furnham, A. (2003). Use of personality variables in work settings. In W.
Borman, D. Ilgen, & R. Klimoski (Eds.), Handbook of psychology (pp. 131–169). New
York, NY: Wiley.
Hu, Q., Dinev, T., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2012). Managing employee compliance with
information security policies: The critical role of top management and organizational
culture. Decision Sciences, 43(4), 615-660.
John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., & Soto, C. J. (2008). Paradigm shift to the integrative Big Five trait
taxonomy. Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 3, 114-158.
Johnson, J. W. (1996). Linking employee perceptions of service climate to customer satisfaction.
Personnel Psychology, 49(4), 831-851.
Judge, T. A., Rodell, J. B., Klinger, R. L., Simon, L. S., & Crawford, E. R. (2013). Hierarchical
representations of the five-factor model of personality in predicting job performance:
Integrating three organizing frameworks with two theoretical perspectives. Journal Of
Applied Psychology, (6),

50

Kelly, E. (2015, June 27). OPM hack Q&A: What we know and what we don't. Retrieved
November 17, 2015, from
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/27/opm-hack-questions-andanswers/29333211/
Kessler, S. R., Pindek, S., Kleinman, G., Andel, S. A., & Spector P. E. (2016). Promoting
cybersecurity within healthcare. Paper presented at the Academy of Management
conference, Atlanta, GA, August 4-8.Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of
behavior: A meta-analysis of the empirical literature. Personality and social psychology
bulletin, 21(1), 58-75.
Krombholz, K., Hobel, H., Huber, M., & Weippl, E. (2014). Advanced social engineering
attacks. Journal of Information Security and Applications 10/2014, 22. DOI:
10.1016/j.jisa.2014.09.005
LePine, J. A., & Van Dyne, L. (2001). Voice and cooperative behavior as contrasting forms of
contextual performance: evidence of differential relationships with big five personality
characteristics and cognitive ability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(2), 326.
Likert, R. (1961). New patterns of management.
Litwin, G. H., & Stringer, R. A. (1968). Motivation and organizational climate. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Business School, Division of Research.
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., & Sugawara, H. M. (1996). Power analysis and
determination of sample size for covariance structure modeling. Psychological methods,
1(2), 130.
Mathieson, K. (1991), ``Predicting user intentions: Comparing the technology acceptance model
with the theory of planned behavior. Information System Research, Vol. 3 No. 2,

51

pp. 173-91.
Martin, J. (2017) Something Looks Phishy Here: Applications of Signal Detection Theory to
Cyber-Security Behaviors in the Workplace
Muthén, L.K. and Muthén, B.O. (1998-2012). Mplus User’s Guide. Seventh Edition. Los
Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén
Neal, A., & Griffin, M. A. (2004). Safety climate and safety at work. The Psychology of
Workplace Safety, 15-34.
Patterson, M. G., West, M. A., Shackleton, V. J., Dawson, J. F., Lawthom, R., Maitlis, S., &
Wallace, A. M. (2005). Validating the organizational climate measure: links to
managerial practices, productivity and innovation. Journal of organizational behavior,
26(4), 379-408.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. Psychological monographs: General and applied,80(1), 1.
Russell, M. T., Cattell, R. B., Cattell, A. K. S., Cattell, H. E., & Karol, D. L. (1994). 16PF Fifth
Edition Administrator's manual. Institute for Personality and Ability Testing,
Incorporated.
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selection methods in personnel
psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of research findings.
Psychological Bulletin, 124(2), 262.
Schaller, R. R. (1997). Moore's law: past, present and future. Spectrum, IEEE,34(6), 52-59.
Schneider B., & Barbera K., (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Climate and
Culture. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press

52

Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. H. (2011). Organizational climate research:
achievements and the road ahead. In N. M. Ashkanasy, C. P. M. Wilderom, & M. F.
Peterson (Eds.), Handbook of organizational culture and climate, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Schneider, B., & Snyder, R. A. (1975). Some relationships between job satisfaction and
organization climate. Journal of Applied Psychology, 60(3), 318.
Siponen, M. T. (2000). A conceptual foundation for organizational information security
awareness. Information Management & Computer Security, 8(1), 31.
doi:10.1108/09685220010371394
Spector, P. E. (1982). Behavior in organizations as a function of employee's locus of
control. Psychological Bulletin, 91(3), 482.
Spector, P. E. (1988). Development of the work locus of control scale. Journal of Occupational
Psychology, 61(4), 335-340.
Symantec (2015). ISTR20 Internet Security Report. April 2015, Volume 20.
Thoresen, C. J., Kaplan, S. A., Barsky, A. P., Warren, C. R., & de Chermont, K. (2003). The
affective underpinnings of job perceptions and attitudes: A meta-analytic review and
integration. Psychological Bulletin, 129(6), 914-945. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.6.914
Tupes, E. C, & Christal, R. E. (1961). Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings (USAF
ASD Tech. Rep. No. 61-97). Lackland Air Force Base, TX: U.S. Air Force.
Valcour, P. M., & Hunter, L. W. (2005). Technology, organizations, and work-life integration
(pp. 61-84). na.

53

Vandenberg, R. J., & Nelson, J. B. (1999). Disaggregating the motives underlying turnover
intentions: When do intentions predict turnover behavior?. Human relations, 52(10),
1313-1336.
Von Solms, R., & Van Niekerk, J. (2013). From information security to cyber security.
Computers & Security, 38, 97-102.
Workman, M., Bommer, W. H., & Straub, D. (2008). Security lapses and the omission of
information security measures: A threat control model and empirical test. Computers in
Human Behavior, 24(6), 2799-2816.
Zengerle, P., & Cassella, M. (2015). Millions more Americans hit by government personnel data
hack. Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-usaidUSKCN0PJ2M420150709.
Zetter, K. (2014). Sony got hacked hard: What we know and don’t know so far. Retrieved
November 14, 2015, from http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied
implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(1), 96-102. doi:10.1037/00219010.65.1.96

54

Table 7. Correlation Matrix of Study Variables * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01; n = 377
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1. Policy
Adherence
2. Perceive
Vulnerability
3. Orderliness

.28**
.18**

.06

.45**

.20**

.39**

.27**

.12*

.52**

.54**

.26**

.13*

.50**

.63**

.56**

.38**

.13*

.21**

.63**

.38**

.38**

.36**

.12*

.34**

.70**

.44**

.57**

.60**

.08

.09

-.07

.04

-.10

-.08

.23**

-.01

.27**

.14**

.03

.30**

.19**

.16**

.33**

.18**

.40**

11. Positive
Emotions

.14**

.08

.18**

.28**

.38**

.07

.49**

.22**

.18**

.23**

12. Cyber
Behavior

.56**

.20**

.20**

.51**

.29**

.29**

.40**

.37**

.14**

.31**

.16**

13. Cyber
Climate

.53**

.20**

.11*

.40**

.32**

.26**

.41**

.36**

.08

.35**

.25**

.58**

14. Locus of
Control

.35**

.14**

.07

.31**

.26**

.23**

.22**

.21**

.01

.27**

.14**

.41**

4. Dutifulness
5. SelfDiscipline
6. Deliberation
7. Altruism
8. Compliance
9. Fantasy
10. Intellect
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.45**

14

Figures

Figure 1: Model of the theory of planned behavior.
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Figure 2: Refined theory of planned behavior with cyber adaptation to variables.
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Figure 3: Hypothesized Structural Model.
Note: Personality facets will covary, paths not shown in picture for clarity.
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Figure 4: Hypothesized Model with only Significant Paths in Model

59

Figure 5: Alternative Hypothesized Model with LOC to Cybersecurity Attitudes
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Appendices
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Appendix A: Pilot Study Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale
Please answer on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) about how you feel the
statement reflect your own views.
1. I feel it is necessary to use strong passwords for my applications at work.
2. I feel it is important to follow organizational cybersecurity policies.
3. I believe it is more important to get my work done in a timely fashion than to follow cybersecurity
policies.
4. I feel it is important to never intentionally violate my organization’s cybersecurity policies.
5. I feel all email attachments I receive at my work email address are safe to download.
6. I feel it is inconvenient to have different passwords at work for different applications.
7. I believe it is unlikely I could be a victim of a cyberattack at work.
8. I believe I am vulnerable to my personal confidential information being stolen from my organization
in a cyberattack.
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Appendix B: Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale Version 2
Please answer on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) about how you feel the
statement reflect your own views.
1. I feel it is necessary to use strong passwords for my applications at work.
2. I feel it is important to follow organizational cybersecurity policies.
3. I feel it is important to never intentionally violate my organization’s cybersecurity policies.
4. I feel all email attachments I receive at my work email address are safe to download.
5. I believe it is unlikely I could be a victim of a cyberattack at work.
6. I believe I am vulnerable to my personal confidential information being stolen from my organization
in a cyberattack.
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Appendix C: Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale (Final Version)
1. I feel it is necessary to use strong passwords for my applications at work.
2. I feel it is important to follow organizational cybersecurity policies.
3. I feel it is important to never intentionally violate my organization’s cybersecurity policies.
4. I feel it is in my best personal interest to follow my organization’s cybersecurity policies.
5. I feel it is in my employer’s best interest to hire individuals who follow the organization’s
cybersecurity policies.
6. I feel it is possible I could receive a harmful email attachment at my work email address.
7. I feel it is possible that my organization could be the victim of a cyberattack.
8. I feel it is possible that I could be a victim of a cyberattack at work.
9. I feel it is possible that an employee browsing the internet could lead to a cyberattack at my
organization
10. I feel I am vulnerable to my personal information being stolen from my organization in a
cyberattack.
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Appendix D: Personality Facets (NEO)
On the following page, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are
now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age.
So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute
confidence.
Please read each statement carefully, and then select an option on the scale.
Response Options: 1 = “Very Inaccurate”; 2 = “Moderately Inaccurate”; 3 = “Neither Inaccurate
nor Accurate”; 4 = “Moderately Accurate”; 5 = “Very Accurate”
Orderliness (.82)
+ keyed
Like order.
Like to tidy up.
Want everything to be "just right."
Love order and regularity.
Do things according to a plan.
– keyed
Often forget to put things back in their proper place.
Leave a mess in my room.
Leave my belongings around.
Am not bothered by messy people.
Am not bothered by disorder.
Dutifulness (.71)
+ keyed
Try to follow the rules.
Keep my promises.
Pay my bills on time.
Tell the truth.
Listen to my conscience.
– keyed
Break rules.
Break my promises.
Get others to do my duties.
Do the opposite of what is asked.
Misrepresent the facts.
Self-Discipline (.85)
+ keyed
Get chores done right away.
65

Am always prepared.
Start tasks right away.
Get to work at once.
Carry out my plans.
– keyed
Find it difficult to get down to work.
Waste my time.
Need a push to get started.
Have difficulty starting tasks.
Postpone decisions.
Cautiousness (Deliberation) (.76)
+ keyed
Avoid mistakes.
Choose my words with care.
Stick to my chosen path.
– keyed
Jump into things without thinking.
Make rash decisions.
Like to act on a whim.
Rush into things.
Do crazy things.
Act without thinking.
Often make last-minute plans.
Altruism (.77)
+ keyed
Make people feel welcome.
Anticipate the needs of others.
Love to help others.
Am concerned about others.
Have a good word for everyone.
– keyed
Look down on others.
Am indifferent to the feelings of others.
Make people feel uncomfortable.
Turn my back on others.
Take no time for others.
Morality (Compliance) (.75)
+ keyed
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Would never cheat on my taxes.
Stick to the rules.
– keyed
Use flattery to get ahead.
Use others for my own ends.
Know how to get around the rules.
Cheat to get ahead.
Put people under pressure.
Pretend to be concerned for others.
Take advantage of others.
Obstruct others' plans.
Imagination (Fantasy) (.83)
+ keyed
Have a vivid imagination.
Enjoy wild flights of fantasy.
Love to daydream.
Like to get lost in thought.
Indulge in my fantasies.
Spend time reflecting on things.
– keyed
Seldom daydream.
Do not have a good imagination.
Seldom get lost in thought.
Have difficulty imagining things.
Intellect (Ideas) (.86)
+ keyed
Like to solve complex problems.
Love to read challenging material.
Have a rich vocabulary.
Can handle a lot of information.
Enjoy thinking about things.
– keyed
Am not interested in abstract ideas.
Avoid philosophical discussions.
Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
Am not interested in theoretical discussions.
Avoid difficult reading material.
Positive Emotions (.81)
+ keyed
Radiate joy.
Have a lot of fun.
Express childlike joy.
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Laugh my way through life.
Love life.
Look at the bright side of life.
Laugh aloud.
Amuse my friends.
– keyed
Am not easily amused.
Seldom joke around.
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Appendix E: Big-Five Personality Factors (IPIP)
On the following page, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are
now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to
other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can
describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence.
Please read each statement carefully, and then select an option on the scale.
Response Options: 1 = “Very Inaccurate”; 2 = “Moderately Inaccurate”; 3 = “Neither Inaccurate
nor Accurate”; 4 = “Moderately Accurate”; 5 = “Very Accurate”
Extraversion (.87)
+ keyed
Am the life of the party.
Feel comfortable around people.
Start conversations.
Talk to a lot of different people at parties.
Don't mind being the center of attention.
– keyed
Don't talk a lot.
Keep in the background.
Have little to say.
Don't like to draw attention to myself.
Am quiet around strangers.
Agreeableness (.82)
+ keyed
Am interested in people.
Sympathize with others' feelings.
Have a soft heart.
Take time out for others.
Feel others' emotions.
Make people feel at ease.
– keyed
Am not really interested in others.
Insult people.
Am not interested in other people's problems.
Feel little concern for others.
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Conscientiousness (.79)
+ keyed
Am always prepared.
Pay attention to details.
Get chores done right away.
Like order.
Follow a schedule.
Am exacting in my work.
– keyed
Leave my belongings around.
Make a mess of things.
Often forget to put things back in their proper place.
Shirk my duties.
Emotional Stability (.86)
+ keyed
Am relaxed most of the time.
Seldom feel blue.
– keyed
Get stressed out easily.
Worry about things.
Am easily disturbed.
Get upset easily.
Change my mood a lot.
Have frequent mood swings.
Get irritated easily.
Often feel blue.
Intellect or Imagination (.84)
+ keyed
Have a rich vocabulary.
Have a vivid imagination.
Have excellent ideas.
Am quick to understand things.
Use difficult words.
Spend time reflecting on things.
Am full of ideas.
– keyed
Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
Am not interested in abstract ideas.
Do not have a good imagination.
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Appendix F: Cybersecurity Climate Scale
Please answer on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) about how you feel the
statement reflect your own views.
1. Issues related to the protection of private data are discussed in my workplace.
2. My supervisor frequently checks to see if we are all obeying rules related to the protection of private
data.
3. Throughout the work week, my supervisor frequently talks about issues related to the protection of
private data.
4. My supervisor says a good word whenever he sees actions taken that promote the protection of
private data.
5. In my workplace it is worthwhile to put extra effort into protecting private data.
6. In my workplace it is important to maintain the protection of private data at all times.
7. In my workplace it is important to reduce the risk of data breaches.
8. In my workplace in order to get the work done, one must ignore some policies related to the
protection of private data.
9. In my workplace, policies and procedures regarding the protection of private data are routinely
ignored.
10. In my workplace, ignoring procedures regarding the protection of private data is acceptable.
11. My supervisor expects me to cut corners regarding the protection of private data and work faster
when work is behind schedule.
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Appendix G: Safety Climate Scale
Please answer on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) about how you feel the
statement reflect your own views.
1. New employees learn quickly that they are expected to follow good health and safety practices.
2. Employees are told when they do not follow good health and safety practices.
3. Workers and management work together to ensure the safest possible conditions.
4. There are no major shortcuts taken when worker health and safety are at stake.
5. The health and safety of workers is a high priority with management where I work.
6. I feel free to report safety problems where I work.
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Appendix H: Perceived Behavioral Control Scale
Please answer on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) about how you feel the
statement reflect your own views.
1. Keeping my confidential information safe is beyond my control.
2. I believe that it is within my control to protect myself from information security violations.
3. The primary responsibility for protecting my confidential information belongs to myself.
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Appendix I: Cybersecurity Behavior Scale
Please answer on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) about how you feel the
statement reflect your own views.
1. I follow my organization’s cybersecurity policies.
2. I comply with organizational IS security policies to protect the organization's information systems.
3. I follow organizational policies with regard to computer usage.
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Appendix J: IRB Approval Letter

October 23, 2017
David Howard
Psychology
St. Pete Beach, FL 33706
RE: Exempt Certification
IRB#: Pro00030997
Title: Development of the Cybersecurity Attitudes Scale and Modeling Cybersecurity Behaviors
and its Antecedents
Dear Mr. Howard:
On 10/21/2017, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets
criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior,
unless:
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified,
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal
or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in
the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is
closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously
declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation
of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not
warrant an amendment or new application.
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not
limit your ability to conduct your research project.
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We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
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Sincerely,

Mark Ruiz, PhD, Vice
Chairperson USF Institutional
Review Board
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